

Yale Talk: Conversations with Peter Salovey

Episode 27: Yale Experts on the War in Ukraine

Guest: Timothy Snyder, Richard C. Levin Professor of History and Jim Levinsohn, Charles W. Goodyear Professor of Management and professor of Economics, and Director of the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs

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FULL TRANSCRIPT

Peter Salovey: Hello everyone. I'm Peter Salovey, and welcome to a special edition of Yale Talk. Today, I'm joined by two Yale experts for a discussion about Vladimir Putin's ruthless invasion of Ukraine. It's a rapidly changing situation on the ground as we record this episode. But already, Putin's military campaign has killed thousands of civilians, decimated residential areas, and threatened nuclear catastrophe. His brutal disregard for life is an assault on our common humanity. And at Yale, we've condemned Putin's war of aggression in the strongest terms. Of course, we grieve for the lives lost, and we are strongly committed to caring for Ukrainian scholars and students, as well as those from elsewhere in the region. Their wellbeing is at the forefront of our minds and efforts. In parallel to our work with individual students, Yale faculty members are helping policymakers navigate this crisis, and I'm delighted to welcome two of them today. Jim Levinsohn is the founding director of the Jackson Institute, which is transitioning to become the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs. Jim will be the inaugural dean of this new professional school at Yale, and he's also the Charles W. Goodyear Professor in global affairs and a professor of economics and management. Outside of Yale, he's a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Tim Snyder, my other guest today, is the Richard C. Levin Professor of History. He is a world-renowned scholar who has written extensively about Ukraine and Russia. Thank you both for joining me today. So, let's start by looking back to Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea. Tim, you have talked a little bit about critical contrast between now and eight years ago. There seems to be a disconnect in the relationship between Putin and the Russian people. There are big differences in the way the propaganda campaigns for each of these invasions have been carried out. Maybe you could talk a little bit about 2014 versus 2022.

Tim Snyder: Thanks, Peter. When I was in Europe back then, 2013, 2014, I had this strange feeling that something was coming, and I actually predicted that Russia would invade Ukraine at the time. And the reason why I could predict it was that there was this steady up-tick escalation of propaganda in late 2013, early 2014. This time that's been different. This time, it seems that Mr. Putin only prepared a few people for this invasion. It seems to be legitimately the case that the soldiers on the battlefield really did think they were on a training exercise, and the Russian public certainly wasn't prepared. So there's a big difference there. There's no euphoria like there was in 2014 with the quick and easy seizure of Crimea. A second difference on the Ukrainian side is that we have gotten much better at listening to the Ukrainians. There's a drastic difference in the news coverage this time around, where journalists really want to hear from Ukrainians; and Ukrainians are treated as a subject, as an agent, as an actor in all of this, as opposed to just being some kind of piece on a chessboard. That's been a dramatic difference. And a little of the credit goes to us. But a lot of it goes to the Ukrainians themselves, who have done an awful lot in terms of learning English, training journalists, preparing civil society--such that when this terrible moment came, they would be able to reach us.

Peter Salovey: And, of course, President Zelenskyy...

Tim Snyder: Yeah.

Peter Salovey: ...seems to be a very good communicator.

Tim Snyder: Yeah, I was on *60 Minutes* right before this started, and I was sort of pressed on this question because a lot of folks in America thought that Ukraine would fold right away and Zelenskyy would run. I think the experience of Afghanistan was on people's minds. And I said, "No, no, this is a little guy who's used to standing up to big guys. He's going to stand put," and he's done that. And it's been a reminder of how an individual with an important time and place exemplifying certain virtues like patriotism, like courage, like self-sacrifice, can make a difference, not only to his country, but to the world. And I have the feeling that what he and Ukrainians have done in staying and fighting has given the rest of us time to think about what we really care about, and what we might do to preserve the institutions that we really think are important.

Peter Salovey: Would you have predicted President Zelenskyy would have adopted this role? You know, he's an actor, a comedian, it's an unusual background for a head of state.

Tim Snyder: But see, that's what's great about democracy. If you really have a democracy, you really will get unpredictable results. And so you really might get this not incredibly tall, Russian-speaking Jewish guy to be the president of Ukraine. I don't mean to boast, but I did predict it. I did say that he was going to stand tough. And the reason I had that feeling is that he wasn't really pushed around by Trump the last time around. There have been a lot of occasions where people have tried to push him around, and he's always had something clever to say, and nevertheless, stood his ground. And in his presidential campaign, he showed himself to be a kind of person who was stubborn and didn't seem to be subject to the normal kinds of political pressure. He didn't seem to be psychologically very vulnerable. I wasn't surprised. But I have to say, I am grateful. It's important that people set examples.

Jim Levinsohn: I listened to his speech before Congress, and you just couldn't help but be moved. He was very, very articulate. Really impressive.

Tim Snyder: What I find striking is that, as you say, Peter, he was a comedian. But he has a skillset. And this skillset means that he actually understands his audience, whether that's the Ukrainian people or the Canadian parliament or the British parliament or our Congress. And he's willing to speak directly to values. He's willing to say, I'm standing for certain things.

Peter Salovey: There's a lesson in this for all leaders, I think, not just ones in the political realm. There was a survey that recently came out that showed that prior to the current crisis, there is majority support among Ukrainians for joining NATO, for joining the EU. And you, Tim, have described in foreign policy, you've described Ukraine as Europe's chance for survival and renewal. So, I wonder if you could each talk a little bit about NATO, Ukraine, and the EU; also, where we think this is leading with respect to those issues. Is there going to be a compromise, not a full membership, some alternative that will satisfy the Russians?

Tim Snyder: Jim is gesturing at me. I want to say that for the record.

Jim Levinsohn: Well, Tim, you are the Ukraine expert here.

Tim Snyder: The Ukrainians understand something about European integration that you tend to understand from the outside, which is the point of European integration, is to repair and help sustain the broken, problematic states that emerge from empire. That's its historical role. It tells a story about how it's about nation states, but it's not. It's about what you do during imperial breakup, whether you're a big empire that's lost its periphery or whether you are the periphery. That's what the European Union has done. And from the outside, if you're Ukraine, which is a democracy and as we have seen, it's a state that can function, it's nevertheless a state with tremendous problems. And like other states with those problems, it thinks, well, the European Union would help. It would help with the rule of law. It would help with equality. In 2014 and in 2022, the Ukrainians themselves have connected their struggle with Europe. And I do hope that the Europeans will listen, not only in offering negotiations for membership, but also in jumping ahead with all the other kinds of things. There has to be some kind of European Marshall Plan and an American Marshall Plan too, to rebuild Ukraine, to Europeanize Ukraine, by going into Ukraine as soon as this is over, with investment, with aid, with everything that one can bring to show that at the end of a war like this will be something positive for the Ukrainians. As far as NATO, Ukraine is a sovereign state. With NATO, that's been the crucial thing the whole time. That Russia refused to talk to Ukraine about this. Putin refused to talk to Zelenskyy. He insisted on going above their heads and talking to us. But Ukraine is a sovereign state, and so if there's going to be a settlement, it will be the Ukrainian leadership that decides what's it going to do about NATO and about neutrality.

Peter Salovey: This seems crucial, right? It's a failure on Putin's part to even recognize them as sovereign, recognize them as a neighboring democracy in this case, and instead trying to pretend, by his actions, that the reality on the ground is something different.

Tim Snyder: That's a really important point, and I think it goes very deep, and it helps us to see through certain misunderstandings, because if we think this is just about some kind of policy difference, we can say, well, why don't they just talk to each other about this policy difference? But that's what Russia explicitly refused to do. And Russian leaders, in quite offensive ways, characterized Ukraine and its leaders. I'm not even going to repeat the kinds of things that they say about Mr. Zelenskyy, because they're just so awful. And also, the reference to Ukrainian state has been a vassal or has been a puppet, and so on. And that treatment of Ukraine as an object, you know, rather than a subject, that's the fundamental problem. You know, Mr. Putin's explanation for this whole war is that Ukraine as a nation doesn't really exist, but I'm going to come in with my army and I'm going to create this deep reality, which is a very radical and violent aim: to take a nation of 40 million and say, we're going to transform you through violence so that you understand who you really are. It hasn't worked, of course. It's had the opposite effect. But that premise is where the war comes from.

Peter Salovey: The identity is not easily moved, I think, through violence. What do we think about the typical Russian in the street of Saint Petersburg, of Moscow? Do they buy Putin's description of Ukrainians? I don't mean just the ones who have protested and been arrested. I mean, if you ran into your local neighborhood shopkeeper, what does that person believe?

Tim Snyder: We should first recognize how hard it is to say, because the media blackout in Russia is something extraordinary. We're in a situation where this heroic handful of journalists who we've listened to for the years, they can no longer work. And Russian television is just a loop of not especially good, but very redundant, propaganda all the time. And most people get their news in Russia still from television. People are now getting arrested in Russia for walking out on the street, holding a blank piece of paper, or

holding a piece of paper with a biblical verse. And if you use the word "war" to describe what's happening, in principle, you can be sentenced to 15 years in prison, which is extraordinary even by the standards of the Soviet Union. That's something extraordinary. I guess what I'm trying to say is that a lot of people are afraid, and a lot of people find it simplest to just repeat what they're told. Another tricky factor here is that most Russians--polls show around two-thirds--think of Russia and Ukraine as being in some way close to each other. So, the idea that Russia would be attacking Ukraine is somehow hard for them to process. This is the notion of the 'big lie.' The things that are hardest to process are the things that run most squarely against your preconceptions about the way the world actually is.

Peter Salovey: So, they don't necessarily believe.

Tim Snyder: It's not just that they've been lied to. It's that they don't want to believe something like this can be so awful. And you felt that in the reaction in the first hours, in the first days. The people who did understand what was happening, they were so ashamed. There was this initial wave of shame. I think now it will be another couple weeks before the reality sinks in completely. But if this war does go on, which I hope it doesn't, for two or three more weeks, I think there will be a second wave where the people you're talking about are going to get what's going on. And I think that's going to be a real trouble for the Russian leadership.

Peter Salovey: We were talking about Europe's chance for survival and renewal, and Ukraine joining NATO and the EU, but there's been resistance in Europe. Jim, I don't know if you want to say a word about that. They haven't jumped to fast-track EU membership for Ukraine.

Jim Levinsohn: My understanding is that membership into the EU is a very, very long process. That said, it seems to me that NATO's played a very, very important role here. I think the world would probably look really different today were it not for the existence of NATO. It's put some boundaries on where I think Russia is willing to go, and the possibility of Ukrainian membership into NATO is a bargaining chip. We often read about the importance of providing Mr. Putin an off-ramp. Perhaps it will end up being the case that a promise to remain neutral would be something that would be a part of a negotiated settlement. It's hard to see how this plays out, but I do think it's important to recognize the importance that NATO has had in the conflict so far.

Peter Salovey: Do you feel the same way about sanctions? These are unprecedented sanctions, in some ways considered harshest in modern history. But can you make them stop through economic action?

Jim Levinsohn: I don't think anyone knows. That would require knowing sort of how Mr. Putin thinks about this. But I do think that the sanctions have been hugely important. I think that the focus on primary sanctions is appropriate. But I think something that we haven't read perhaps quite as much about, is the role of so-called secondary sanctions. And I think that the role of secondary sanctions is quietly playing a role in how China is doing this. I was having a wonderful conversation with our colleague and Jackson Senior Fellow, Ernesto Zedillo. Ernesto teaches a class on globalization.

Peter Salovey: He was the former president of Mexico.

Jim Levinsohn: That's right. And a Ph.D. economist. We were talking, and international trade has really taken a hit as countries have moved away from it, as countries have recognized some of the political divisions that trade has wrought, domestically. But if it wasn't for Russia's integration into the global

economy, if Russia was still our target as it had been in the late 1980s, we wouldn't have this tool of economic sanctions to then deploy. It's an alternative to the so-called hot war. And I think it's a hugely important tool. Whether it's enough to move the dial, in terms of outcomes, I don't know. Tim, what do you think?

Tim Snyder: I think I agree with you that we're in uncharted territory, and it's important to be clear about what it is you're actually trying to do with the sanctions. What is the outcome you're aiming for? If the outcome is to stop the war, that means either that Mr. Putin falls from power, or that he changes his mind. Those are the two ways that the war can come to an end. And so that means you have to create some concatenation of factors, which makes him fear that he's going to lose power. And I think that sanctions play a very significant role in that. And I believe that in combination with Ukrainian battlefield resistance, world public opinion, and a certain amount of Russian resistance, you could see a combination where it might get through to the Russian leadership that the world is not the world that they thought it was. So, I would say I put it in the category of necessary but not sufficient.

Peter Salovey: In the category of alternatives or additions, I saw that Senator Blumenthal yesterday was calling for direct military aid. Is this something you would favor?

Tim Snyder: Well, the equipment, we've been doing, and it's a very good thing. And I should say, not just us. And this is an interesting part about this whole approach. The Biden administration has not said we're going to solve this problem with X, Y or Z. Everything that we have done, somebody else has done, and often bearing greater costs. So, with sanctions, the Europeans bear far greater costs than we do. And with the weapons deliveries, we're doing it. But then a whole range of other countries are also doing it. And it is important because you have this country, the president is willing to stay and risk his life. This was a war whose aim was to kill that man, and to kill the Ukrainian leadership, and to overthrow that government, and to replace it with a different government which would be pro-Russian, and to kill or eliminate the Ukrainian elites, so that the Ukrainian masses would be pro-Russian. But we're dealing with a case where he has stayed, and people are willing to fight. And just as importantly, you have millions of people in the background who are just going about their daily business and doing more, helping with supplies, taking in other people's children, helping other people flee the country. So, you have millions of people who are willing to live under conditions of risk. And what we have done in supplying humanitarian and military aid is to make that possible, essentially. A lot of my younger colleagues, historians, are on the battlefield right now, as we speak. What European countries and what the United States have done has been to make it safer for them to be out there defending their country.

Jim Levinsohn: And I think, Tim and Peter, that the way that military aid will be most effective itself highlights the importance of allies. So, my understanding is a lot of the military technology that the U.S. has and could provide requires a fair amount of training and that Ukrainians on the ground would not be able to really use that at this point in time. But providing financial support to Poland, to Turkey--it's Turkish drones that are being used. The U.S. drones, the training required to use those--it's not going to happen in a short period of time. But being able to work with allies to get appropriate technology to the Ukrainian fighters I think has been quite important.

Peter Salovey: Many of us are not historians or economists, and not experts on this region of the world. And so we develop an impression, reading the newspaper, seeing the images on television news. What we see are images of hospitals being bombed, of cultural heritage sites being threatened, of Holocaust memorials being destroyed, of civilians fleeing in massive numbers and dying in large numbers. At what

point do Putin's actions constitute war crimes? I know the international criminal court has announced an active investigation following the invasion, and the US Embassy in Ukraine at one point was characterizing Russia's attack on nuclear power plant as a possible war crime. Are these war crimes and if so, what would happen?

Jim Levinsohn: Three word answer I don't know. While I understand and endorse the notion of pursuing the possibility of war crimes, and I think our colleague, former Law School Dean Harold Koh, is involved in this.

Peter Salovey: Yes, he is.

Jim Levinsohn: It's important to realize the pace at which those proceedings move is glacial compared to what's going on on the ground. So, yes, it's important. But is it likely to change things in...

Peter Salovey: In real time.

Jim Levinsohn: ...In real time. Or even in the near term? I'm a little more skeptical, I guess. Tim, what are your views on that?

Tim Snyder: In a technical sense, the answer to your question is obviously, yes. Taking Jim's point about the politics and the temporality, in the legal sense, war crimes are being committed. I mean, just today--remember, it's 7 hours ahead in Ukraine now or six--today, an independent reporter released video which showed the results of Russian soldiers shooting to death Ukrainian civilians waiting in a bread line. By any standard, that's a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and pretty much anything that you could think of in international law of war. And then buildings that I know, buildings that I've stood in front of, have now been shelled and destroyed. I mean, beautiful parts of central Kharkiv, which is second city in Ukraine, have been shelled. Mariupol's maternity ward was shelled, and there were pictures of a woman with her child escaping, later died. A couple of thousand people are probably dead in Mariupol at this point, at a minimum. These are war crimes. When you attack civilians, you are committing war crimes. The point that I would make, in addition, is that the whole war was a crime. The whole invasion was a crime. You can't just invade another country for no reason, like that itself is a crime.

Peter Salovey: Unprovoked.

Tim Snyder: Yeah.

Peter Salovey: Invasion of sovereign country.

Tim Snyder: Yeah. I mean, from the moment that a Russian soldier crossed the border, that was already a kind of criminal activity. And insofar as crime involves intent, the fact that Putin, and not just Putin, was talking about the destruction of the Ukrainian state and nation. This has not been so widely reported, but it's something that people in my milieu talk about a lot. The Russians accidentally published a victory declaration. So, they had the press prepared for how the scenario was supposed to unfold. They were going to go in when they removed the Ukrainian leadership. They were going to round up, eliminate civic and political elites, and then Ukrainians were going to go along with it. They had their press prepared for that scenario. And then, of course, that scenario didn't unfold. But one of the most central official Russian

news sites accidentally published the victory declaration. And that victory declaration is terrifying, because in it you see that what was really meant was that Ukrainian political and civil elites were going to be eliminated, and the Ukrainian state was going to cease to exist. That was the basic idea. I say all that because if we're thinking about whether something is a crime, the intention to do something like that is part of the story.

Peter Salovey: Why don't we return to a different kind of image that we see every day? And you addressed this a bit already, Tim, and that is the heroism displayed by Ukrainian civilians, by soldiers, by Russian protesters. They give me some cause for hope, and you certainly express that as well. But in the face of Putin, can this resolve be maintained, and can it ultimately mean some kind of victorious outcome for Ukraine?

Tim Snyder: I'm not going to hedge, but I want to say something before I answer that question. It's not all about whether they win or lose. It's also about how they've lived along the way. To give you a kind of striking example, this has been a difficult two and a half weeks for me, and for everyone I care about who cares about Ukraine. But when I talk to my friends in Ukraine who are doing things like reporting from the front line, most of whom are now displaced from their homes. When I talk to them, they're the ones who are calming me down. Not because they're intending to, but because they know what they're doing. They have a purpose. They're doing the things that they think they should be doing. And so, in this horror that surrounds them, they're behaving well. And the fact that they're behaving well ripples out towards the rest of us. And so even if they lose, which I don't think they will, but even if they lose, this example of how one behaves under duress, I think itself is a historical fact, just worthy of being remembered. I was in Vienna over the weekend doing some things related to Ukraine, and there was a reading of Ukrainian texts, some Russian and some Gaela Russian too, in the Volkstheater in Vienna. And the actors were crying on the stage, which is something I'd never seen before. But there was a particular text by a Ukrainian writer called Katja Petrowskaya, where she had she's talking about every time she feels depressed, and she thinks that the Ukrainians are going to lose. What does she do? She calls her friend in Ukraine and just says her friend's name, Sasha, and then her friend turns on the video and shows the family and shows the apartment, and how, like the children are smiling and how life is going on, and that they're cheerful despite everything. In the theater, a bunch of people sobbed at that moment because they recognized the truth of that. That they, too, had been calling their friends in Ukraine, and they too had had this experience that it was the Ukrainians who are actually giving solace to the other people. And that seems to me to be very important. But as to whether this can turn out well, yes, I think just looking at the battlefield results, it's striking how well they're doing. And I think they are getting the Russians to a point. The Russians are going to feel like they're going to have to take some kind of compromise.

Peter Salovey: Yeah. You see it the same way, Jim?

Jim Levinsohn: I do. Tim has many more contacts, but I do see it that way.

Peter Salovey: Yeah. Final question. Let's talk a little bit about the Yale University, vis-a-vis this horrible situation. The Jackson Institute will become the Jackson School. How do you teach in Jackson around students who are curious, terrified, whatever their motivation is? And then maybe we could talk a little bit about the way you would teach about this region of the world and what's happening on the ground now in a professional school like the Jackson School versus, say, in a Department of History, or at the McMillan Center and its council that focuses on Russia and Eastern Europe. We have all of this at Yale. They

represent different approaches to scholarship and education. Maybe we could talk a little bit about each of them, in this context. Jim?

Jim Levinsohn: There's a huge amount of concern and interest. It was about a week ago, Jackson hosted a panel for the university. Tim, our colleague Arne Westad, and one of the Jackson graduate students who had lived in Ukraine for about five years were there, and the room was packed. There's tremendous concern. There's a desire to learn more and to try to better understand what's going on. As we think about the new Jackson School, one of the things that differentiates it from its peers is that the study of history is part of our core curriculum. And if ever there's a set of events that highlights the importance of understanding history, and trying to make sense of what's going on, I think we probably have Exhibit One right here: we're hugely fortunate Tim is teaching right now. He can talk about how he teaches at Jackson and how that might be different than how he teaches in the history department. Today, this afternoon, some Jackson students are flying to Poland to assist. Last night I was sent a video clip. The head of the Yale Veterans Association, a Yale alum, was in Ukraine volunteering to train civilians, people who had, in the last two weeks, become soldiers. So, I think Yale is engaging in the classroom. Its students are engaging on the ground. There's a tremendous amount of--I don't know if interest is the right word. It's concern: trying to make sense of what's happening, and trying to figure out how to do the right thing.

Peter Salovey: You know, in this very conversation, we have touched on economics. We talked about sanctions. We've discussed political science and trying to figure out the motives of Putin. History, of course, is the big overlay here. And we talked about law, and international law. These are the core disciplines. And.

Jim Levinsohn: You know, they are. There's one that's missing, and it's going to come back to you, Peter. David Brooks had a really interesting column about a week ago saying, yeah, you need to understand history, economics, international relations. But what about social psychology? Because that's probably more important in many ways than formal modeling of international relations. And to me, a little light bulb went off that as we build out the new school, I think that's something we need to pay attention to.

Peter Salovey: Well, this is near and dear to my heart. That is my home discipline. And of course, when we're talking about, for example, our conversation about Zelenskyy, his motives, his leadership style, the decisions he's making about the way he interacts with people in Ukraine, let alone how he presents himself in a persuasive context, those are pretty core issues to a social psychologist. Tim, do you want to talk a little bit about the teaching in all of these contexts? Does it matter?

Tim Snyder: Yeah. Thank you, Peter. I want to give my three cheers for history here.

Peter Salovey: Of course,

Tim Snyder: I've been teaching a survey of East European history at Yale since I got here, for the last 20 years. And I've been really struck, and I've heard this from my colleagues, too, who teach similar things, that the students who came through and took a broad history class in Eastern Europe who are now journalists, or who are now in various parts of the United States government, were prepared for this in a way that they wouldn't otherwise have been. They had the reference points. They knew where the countries were. They had some ability to evaluate myths and propaganda. Because history gives you grounding, where you don't feel like you have to necessarily compromise with the propaganda. You can

just say, Well, that's not so different from this other form of propaganda. And I happen to know that this is what actually happened. So, teaching undergraduate classes on core subjects in history, I think that's proving to be really important. The second thing is we have a lot of MBA students coming from the region. And I just want to mention that some of them are displaced people now, and some of them are in basements sheltering in Ukraine now. And then, as far as Jackson, I'm going to just echo what Jim said. I'm very proud of the fact that history is a core part of the teaching at Jackson. This sets us off from our peers, I think, in a good way. You know, as Jim was saying, I'm teaching the core course, and a lot of the professional school students might not all have understood why history was interesting. I think we're getting there. You know, colleagues are showing them sources, and I think they're having a good time. But they're also, I think, realizing why it's important. Their assignment this semester was to write a paper about 1938. And I think it dawned on them very quickly why that's there.

Peter Salovey: Why it was relevant. Yeah.

Tim Snyder: Right. That we're thinking about diplomacy. We're thinking about the failure of democracies to rally around. We're thinking about how leaders behave before major wars. So, it's a very deep dive into historical methodology, and into history itself. We're covering lots of territory, but they also have this very specific assignment, which they're working on. I want to also mention that at Jackson we have a program called World Fellows where we've had several excellent Ukrainians, including my friend Slava Vakarchuk, who is the most famous rock and roll singer in Ukrainian and very famous in Russia and Belarus, too, for that matter. And he's an example of somebody, I mean, he's just been running around the country helping deliver fuel and supplies, and showing up with soldiers and taking selfies and making videos with them, helping people to get going. And, you know, he's one of ours.

Jim Levinsohn: Yeah.

Peter Salovey: Jim, Tim, I want to thank you both for taking time to speak with me today, sharing your insights with all those who listen to Yale Talk. You know, we're a global research university, and I feel we have a responsibility to create knowledge, to create understanding that ultimately can improve the world. And I don't say that in an arrogant way, but I think it is core to our mission. The two of you exemplify this. I think you're helping to educate the leaders who are going to make policy decisions on behalf of this country and other countries throughout the world in just a few years, and arming them with historical knowledge, political science, economics, social psychology, international relations. All of this seems just critical.

To friends and members of the community, I want to thank you for joining me for this special edition of Yale Talk. At moments like this, it gives me great hope when I see Yalies unite around our shared humanity to support peace abroad, and to support one another on our campus. So, let's continue to keep our thoughts on the Ukrainian people and all those affected by Vladimir Putin's unprovoked invasion. And until our next conversation, best wishes and take care.

The theme music "Butterflies and Bees" is composed by Yale professor of music and director of university bands Thomas C. Duffy and is performed by the Yale Concert Band.